Recent Cases by unknown
Volume 74 




Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases, 74 DICK. L. REV. 514 (1970). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol74/iss3/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Recent Cases
NEGLIGENCE-THE END OF THE IMPACT
RULE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently abolished what is
commonly referred to as the impact rule. In a complete reversal
of existing precedent, the court, in Niederman v. Brodsky' held
that physical impact was no longer a prerequisite to recovery
where the plaintiff sustains injury solely from a fear of being
struck. This decision overruled Bosley v. Andrews 2 and cast
doubt on the present validity of Knaub v. Gotwalt.3
The plaintiff, Harry Niederman, alleged he was standing with
his son on a sidewalk in Philadelphia. The defendant's negligently
operated car skidded onto the sidewalk striking the boy, a pole, a
fire hydrant and a newsstand. The plaintiff claimed that he almost
immediately sustained a heart attack which resulted in a five week
hospital confinement. 4 Since no impact was alleged, the lower
court sustained the defendant's preliminary objections and reluc-
1. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
2. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
3. 422 Pa. 267, 200 A.2d 464 (1966).
4. More specifically, the opinion stated:
Almost immediately after this destructive path was cut by appel-
lee's car, appellant claims that he suffered severe chest pain and
that upon examination in the hospital, where he was confined for
five weeks, appellant was diagnosed to have sustained acute coro-
nary insufficiency, coronary failure, angina pectoris, and possible
myocardial infarction. Consequently, appellant sought recovery
from appellee for both these severe disabilities and the accom-
panying shock and mental pain.
436 Pa. at 402-03, 261 A.2d at 84.
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tantly dismissed the complaint.5 The plaintiff appealed.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding that the plaintiff
was entitled to a trial, stated:
Today, the cows come home.6 We decide that on the
record before us, appellant may go to trial and if he proves
his allegations, recovery may be had from a negligent de-
fendant, despite the fact that appellant's injuries arose in
the absence of actual impact. "It is fundamental to our
common law system that one may seek redress for every
substantial wrong. 'The best statement of the rule is that
a wrongdoer is responsible for the natural and proximate
consequences of his misconduct. . . ."'
Were we to do otherwise, appellant and those who are
severely injured in a like manner would be barred from
recovery in our courts. But the gravity of appellant's in-
jury and the inherent humanitarianism of our judicial
process and its responsiveness to the current needs of justice
dictate that appellant be afforded a chance to present his
case to a jury and perhaps be compensated for the injury
he has incurred. The Restatement has adopted a view in
harmony with this approach. . ..
5. The court quoted the opinion of the lower court which pro-
phetically stated:
The impact rule will, no doubt, eventually be rejected as was the
formerly well-entrenched rule of charitable immunities. It is re-
grettable that Harry Niederman, the plaintiff in this action, may
not be afforded the opportunity to prove that his injuries are just
as real, just as painful, just as disabling as if he had been struck
physically by defendant's motor vehicle. However, we are bound
by the law as set forth by the Supreme Court.
436 Pa. at 403, 261 A.2d at 85.
6. (footnote omitted). (The Atlantic Reporter reads, "Today we
decide .. "). This statement is in response to the late Justice Musman-
no's dissent in Bosley v. Andrews, which denied recovery to the plaintiff
who was chased by the defendant's bull:
In recapitulation I wish to go on record that the policy of non-
liability announced by the Majority in this type of case is insup-
portable in law, logic, and elementary justice-and I shall continue
to dissent from it until the cows come home.
393 Pa. 161, 194-95, 142 A.2d 263, 280 (1958).
7. (footnote omitted); see Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709
(Del. 1965); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Falzone
v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Held v. Red Malcuit, Inc., 12
Ohio Misc. 158, 230 N.E.2d 674 (C.P. 1967); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va.
124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924).
8. 436 Pa. at 403-04, 261 A.2d at 85 (footnote omitted). The court
here quoted from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1965),
which provides:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable
risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by sub-
jecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emo-
tional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the
internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does
not protect the actor from liability.
The court discredited three reasons which it had previously
used for denying recovery in the absence of impact. The first argu-
ment in support of the impact rule was the supposed inability of
medical science to prove causation. The court mentioned the in-
creased sophistication of medicine,9 but quickly pointed out that
the major weakness of this argument is that it was used only when
there had been no contact whatsoever. 10 Medical certainty is not
a prerequisite to recovery if there was any impact, however slight
or harmless."' Moreover, medical testimony is not binding on a
jury,' -2 and it is the plaintiff's burden to prove causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.'3 The court recognized the fallacy
of the impact - no impact distinction, stating:
It appears completely inconsistent to argue that the
medical profession is absolutely unable to establish a causal
connection in the case where there is no impact at all, but
that the slightest impact . . . suddenly bestows upon our
medical colleagues the knowledge and facility to diagnose
the causal connection between emotional states and physi-
9. 436 Pa. at 405, 261 A.2d at 86.
10. Id. at 406-08, 261 A.2d at 86-87, stating:
The logical invalidity of this objection to medical proof can
be demonstrated further by noting that the rule has only been
applied where there is absolutely no impact whatsoever. Once
there is even the slightest impact, it has been held that the plain-
tiff can recover for any damages which resulted from the accom-
panying fright, even though the impact had no causal connection
with the fright-induced injuries. The rule has been stated: "How-
ever, where, as here, a plaintiff sustains bodily injuries, even
though trivial or minor in character, which are accompanied by
fright or mental suffering directly traceable to the peril in which
the defendant's negligence placed the plaintiff, then mental suf-
fering is a legitimate element of damages." Potare v. City of Phil-
adelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 589, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955).
T . . here is no reason to believe that the causal connection
involved here is any more difficult for lawyers to prove or for
judges and jurors to comprehend than many others which occur
elsewhere in the law. "We realize that there may be difficulties
in determining the existence of a causal connection between fright
and subsequent physical injury and in measuring the extent of
such injury. However, the problem of tracing a causal connection
from negligence to injury is not peculiar to cases without impact
and occurs in all types of litigation . . . in any event, difficulty of
proof should not bar the plaintiff from the opportunity of attempt-
ing to convince the trier of fact of the truth of her claim." Falzone
v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 566, 241 A.2d 12, 15-16 (1965). We recognize
the recent view of the New Jersey Supreme Court as representa-
tive of current jurisprudence.
11. See, e.g., Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860
(1906) (dust in the eye); Jones v. Brooklyn R.R., 23 App. Div. 141, 48
N.Y.S. 914 (1897) (miscarriage after small light bulb fell on plaintiff's
head); Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948)
(electrical shock). See also Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App.
581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928), the case of immemorial delight to law students,
where a horse "evacuated his bowels" into the plaintiff's lap.
12. See, e.g., Hughes v. Texas Eastern Transm. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1381
(W.D. Pa. 1969).
13. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 421 Pa. 594, 221
A.2d 163 (1966); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa. Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868
(1961) (upholding a jury's award of $100 after plaintiff presented over
$5500 in medical expenses claimed to have resulted from the accident).
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cal injuries. It can easily be urged that recent advances in
medical sciences have bestowed this ability upon physi-
cians; but it is illogical to argue that the presence of some
slight injury has accomplished the same effect!
14
Even Chief Justice Bell in his dissent 5 was unable to provide any
validity for the medical certainty argument. After describing
many instances where a person might reasonably fear for his
safety, he stated:
In most cases, it would be impossible for medical science
to prove that these subjective symptoms could or could not
possibly have resulted from or been aggravated or precipi-
tated by fright or nervous shock or nervous tension or
emotional disturbance or distress, each of which can in turn
produce an ulcer or headaches or fainting spells or, under
some circumstances, a heart attack, or a serious disease or
other injurious results. Medical science, I repeat, could
not prove but could only guess whether these could or
could not have been caused or precipitated or aggravated
by defendant's alleged negligent act.'6
There is a major weakness in the Chief Justice's reasoning. Medi-
cal science can prove the injury was a result of the act. A properly
qualified medical expert may give his opinion whereby the plaintiff
can support his burden of proof. In this regard, the dissent is not
so much in favor of the impact rule as it is against the indefinite-
ness of causation in injury claims in general. This, however, is
the precise problem encountered routinely in claims for aggravation
of a preexisting arthritic condition, herniated disc, etc. Had there
been an impact, yet the heart attack not occurred until even weeks
later, a plaintiff would have an opportunity to prove his case no
matter how uncertain the medical evidence.'7 Therefore, the court
properly concluded that the medical certainty argument has no
place in modern personal injury litigation.
The second reason previously given in support of the impact
rule was "the fear of fictitious injuries and fraudulent claims."' 8
This is really just another way of stating the medical certainty
argument. The court rejected this fear stating that the danger
was no greater in no-impact cases than in cases where there is
impact and that the judicial process has proven able to cope with
the problem.19 Bell's dissent in this regard merely relied on the
14. 436 Pa. at 407, 261 A.2d at 87.
15. Id. at 413, 261 A.2d at 90.
16. Id. at 419, 261 A.2d at 93 (dissenting opinion).
17. See Polando v. Blue Ridge Transp. Co., 374 Pa. 480, 97 A.2d 828
(1953); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa. Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961).
18. 436 Pa. at 408, 261 A.2d at 87.
19. Id. at 409, 261 A.2d at 88:
statement from Huston v. Freemansburg Borough:20
It requires but a brief judicial experience to be convinced
of the large proportion of exaggeration and even of actual
fraud in the ordinary action for physical injuries from neg-
ligence, and if we opened the door to this new invention the
result would be great danger, if not disaster to the cause of
practical justice .... 21
The majority adequately dispensed with this argument in quoting
from a Delaware case, Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R.,22 "'Public policy
requires the courts, with the aid of the legal and medical profes-
sions, to find ways and means to solve satisfactorily the problems
thus presented - not expedient ways to avoid them.' "23
The Pandora's box argument was the final proposition in sup-
port of the impact rule considered by the court. This theory was
rejected on two grounds. First, said the court, the flood of litiga-
tion has not occurred in other states. 24 "Secondly ...any such
increase should not be determinative or relevant to the availability
of a judicial forum for the adjudication of impartial individual
rights."
25
True to form, in his dissent, Chief Justice Bell relied heavily on
stare decisis. 26 He listed five exceptions to the application of this
principle,27 the last of which was,
The charge that fraudulent claims will arise is not unique to
this Commonwealth. Every court that has been confronted with a
challenge to its impact rule has been threatened with the ominous
spectre that an avalanche of unwarranted, trumped-up, false and
otherwise unmeritorious claims would suddenly cascade upon the
courts of the jurisdiction. The virtually unanimous response has
been that (1) the danger of illusory claims in this area is no
greater than in cases where impact occurs and that (2) our courts
have proven that any protection against such fraudulent claims
is contained within the system itself-in the integrity of our judi-
cial process, the knowledge of expert witnesses, the concern of ju-
ries and the safeguards of our evidentiary standards.
20. 212 Pa. 548, 550-51, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (1905).
21. 436 Pa. at 416-17, 261 A.2d at 91 (dissenting opinion) (Emphasis
omitted).
22. 210 A.2d 709, 714 (Del. 1965).
23. 436 Pa. at 411, 261 A.2d at 88-89.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 412, 261 A.2d at 89.
26. The dissenting opinion stated:
I would hold that the principle of Stare Decisis should always be
applied, irrespective of the changing personnel of this (or any Su-
preme) Court .... Change of circumstances or modern circum-
stances does not mean, nor has it ever heretofore been considered
as the equivalent of change of personnel in the Court.
Id. at 421, 261 A.2d at 93-94. In Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d
646 (1966), the court denied recovery on the basis of the impact rule.
Justices Jones, Eagen, O'Brien and Cohen joined C.J. Bell in his opinion.
Justices Roberts and Musmanno dissented. In the present case, Jones, Ea-
gen, O'Brien, Cohen, Roberts and Pomeroy lined up against the Chief Jus-
tice. Of the six who decided Knaub, only one, Chief Justice Bell, was in
favor of retaining the impact rule. The "changing personnel" consisted of
one new member.
27. The first four exceptions were stated as:
(1) where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is convinced that
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in those rare cases where the Supreme Court is convinced
that the reason for the law undoubtedly no longer exists,
and modern circumstances and Justice combine to require
or justify a change, and no one's present personal rights or
vested property interests will be injured by the change.
28
This is precisely the reason the majority decided to abolish the
impact rule. In summation of its opinion the court stated:
We have carefully examined the arguments in support
of the old impact rule. It seems clear to us that even if
these rationales may have had validity in earlier years...
continued adherence to the rule makes little sense. We
believe that our analysis of the underpinnings of the im-
pact doctrine proves that they are now so weak and that
the arguments opposing the doctrine are so strong that an
overruling of earlier cases is compelled.
29
As a result of Niederman v. Brodsky, Pennsylvania has joined
a very definite majority of states which now require no impact to
recover for an injury.30 Only eleven states currently invoke the
prior decisions of the Court are irreconcilable; or (2) the applica-
tion of a rule or principle has undoubtedly created great confu-
sion; or (3) a rule of law has been only fluctuatingly applied; or
(4) to correct a misconception in an occasional decision ...
436 Pa. at 421, 261 A.2d at 94.
28. Id. (Italics omitted).
29. Id. at 413, 261 A.2d at 89-90.
30. See Sahuc v. United States Fidel. & Guar. Co., 320 F.2d 18 (5th
Cir. 1963) (aff'g dismissal by E.D. La.); Belt v. St. Louis - S.F. Ry., 195 F.2d
241 (10th Cir. 1952) (rev'g judgment n.o.v. by E.D. Okla.); Rogers v.
Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1962); Central of Georgia Ry. v.
Kimber, 212 Ala. 102, 101 So. 827 (1924); Aimaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Sup-
ply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Westesen v.
Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 P. 689 (1925); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146
Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709
(Del. 1965); Usry v. Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 118 S.E.2d 719 (1961); Clemm
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 P. 103 (1928); Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282
Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969); Kelly v. Lowney & Williams, 113 Mont.
385, 126 P.2d 486 (1942); Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890
(1938); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Falzone v.
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176
N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Crews v. Provident Finance Co., 271
N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967); Held v. Red Malcuit, Inc., 12 Ohio Misc.
158, 230 N.E.2d 674 (C.P. 1967) (but injury must be an immediate, sudden
reaction to fright); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202
(1907); Mack v. South Bound Ry., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); Stern-
hagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918); Trent v. Barrows, 55
Tenn. App. 182, 397 S.W.2d 409 (1965); Kaufman v. Miller, 405 S.W.2d 820
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656
(1967); Cherry v. General Petroleum Corp., 172 Wash. 688, 21 P.2d 520
(1933); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Colla v.
Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
impact rule.31 In his dissenting opinion in Knaub v. Gotwalt,3"
the late Justice Musmanno had a valid point in this regard when he
stated:
It is a matter of infinite regret to me that in the train
if Progress in the Law of Humanity, Pennsylvania is a car
frequently clattering close to the caboose instead of cheer-
fully gliding over the rails immediately behind the locomo-
tive.32
Knaub, however, was not the appropriate case in which to repudiate
the impact rule. There, the plaintiffs were the parents and sister
who witnessed a boy who was struck by the defendant's car and
impaled on a picket fence. Tragic as the scene must have been, the
plaintiffs alleged no significant physical injuries other than nausea
and illness. More importantly, they were not in a position to fear
for their own safety.3 4 Therefore, while the decision was based on
the impact rule,3 5 to have permitted recovery would have been un-
precedented in the American courts.36 California in 1968 was the
first state to permit recovery for damages sustained by a plaintiff
who feared only for the safety of another.
3 7
To clarify any confusion that might arise from Niederman, the
court specifically held:
We today choose to abandon the requirement of a
physical impact as a precondition to recovery for damages
proximately caused by the tort in only those cases like the
one before us where the plaintiff was in personal danger
of physical impact because of the direction of a negligent
force against him and where plaintiff actually did fear the
physical impact.38
31. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark.
1959); Hoitt v. Lee's Propane Gas Serv., 182 So. 2d 58 (Fla. App. 1966);
West Chicago St. Ry. v. Liebig, 79 Ill. App. 567 (1899); Boston v. Chesa-
peake & 0. R.R., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945); Kramer v. Rickemeier,
159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v.
Rowman, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1930); Herrick v. Evening Exp. Pub.
Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921); Kisiel v. Holyoke St. Ry., 240 Mass. 29,
132 N.E. 622 (1921); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652
(1923) (but Manie v. Matson Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co., 378 Mich. 650, 148
N.W.2d 779 (1967) implied the rule would not be followed in view of the
weight of authority); McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo.
App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095 (1915); Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550
(1932).
32. 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966).
33. Id. at 273, 220 A.2d at 648.
34. While the parents were seated in their car about twenty-five feet
away, it should be noted that the sister was only about three feet from the
boy at impact.
35. 422 Pa. at 270-72, 220 A.2d at 647-48.
36. 73 DiCm. L. REv. 350, 352 (1969); see, e.g., Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
37. Dillon v. Legg. 63 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968), overruling Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295,
379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436(3) (1965); cf., Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
38. 436 Pa. at 413, 261 A.2d at 90.
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It should be recognized that this language is rather narrow. The
court did not encompass an area in its new rule much beyond the
facts of the case. Three elements appear necessary for recovery:
(1) the plaintiff must be in personal danger of impact, (2) there
must be a negligent force directed at him, and (3) he must actually
fear the impact. This specifically excludes any claim arising out
of fear for a third person as was present in Knaub. --It would,
however, include any near-miss situation such as Bosley v. An-
drews,39 where the plaintiff was chased by the defendant's bull.
The Niederman court relied heavily on Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
4
1
Falzone v. Busch4' and Battalla v. State42 from surrounding juris-
dictions. Both Robb and Falzone fit nicely into the holding of the
present case. In the former, the plaintiff narrowly escaped as the
defendant's locomotive collided with her automobile, which was
stalled on the tracks. In Falzone, the plaintiff alleged the defend-
ant's car struck her husband and, in doing so, came so close to her
as to put her in fear of her own safety. Both plaintiffs had result-
ing physical illness requiring medical attention.
Battalla, however, presented a different situation. The minor
plaintiff was placed on a chair lift by one of the defendant's em-
ployees who failed to properly secure the safety belt. The plaintiff
became hysterical and suffered consequential injuries. There was
no danger of impact, unless it was with the ground, and there was
no negligent force directed against him. Although the stated hold-
ing of Niederman does not conform to this factual situation, the
reasons for permitting recovery are essentially the same. There-
fore, the abrogation of the impact rule will probably be extended
to cases not specifically involving threatened force and impact.43
39. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
40. 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965).
41. 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965), overruling Ward v. West Jersey
& S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).
42. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), overruling
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). Robb, Falzone
and Battalla were cited a total of eighteen times by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Niederman.
43. The recent cases from other jurisdictions have no express require-
ment of force and fear of impact, per se. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214
A.2d 12 (1965) held:
We hold, therefore, that where negligence causes fright from a rea-
sonable fear of immediate personal injury, which fright is ade-
quately demonstrated to have resulted in substantial bodily injury
or sickness, the injured person may recover if such bodily in-
jury or sickness would be regarded as proper elements of dam-
age had they occurred as a consequence of direct physical injury
rather than fright. Of course, where fright does not cause sub-
stantial bodily injury or sickness, it is to be regarded as too lack-
There may be a situation not intended, but actually covered by
the holding. What if the plaintiff had not feared for his own safety,
but for the safety of his son who was struck? This is the "zone of
danger" concept which has a line of non-Pennsylvania cases that
grant recovery. 44 It is interesting to note that in the present case,
the complaint did not mention fear or fright.45 It merely stated
the car skidded onto the sidewalk where the plaintiff was standing
and struck the son. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently
assumed that the plaintiff feared for his own safety when it held
that he had a valid cause of action.4 6 Therefore, it is possible that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will never have to decide whether
one "in the zone of danger" fearing for the safety of another may
recover. It appears that the prudent plaintiff should plead the
objective facts to show his proximity to the occurrence and omit
the subjective fact of fear. In the event, however, that the plaintiff
in the present case does not prove he "actually did fear the
physical impact," the court may have another opportunity to an-
swer this question.
WILLIAM A. ADDAMS
ing in seriousness and too speculative to warrant the imposition
of liability.
Id. at 570, 214 A.2d at 17; accord, Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d
709, 714-15 (Del. 1965); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, 126 Vt. 405, 414, 234
A.2d 656, 660 (1967).
44. See Bowman v. Williams, 264 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); cf., Hop-
per v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965); Cosgrove v. Beymer,
244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59
Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Orlo v. Connecticut Co.,
128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Resavage v. Davis, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d
879 (1952); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
45. 436 Pa. at 402, 261 A.2d at 84.
46. The court stated:
Since appellant's complaint alleges facts which if proven will es-
tablish that the negligent force was aimed at him and put him in
personal danger of physical impact, and that he actually did fear
the force, this case must proceed to trial.
Id. at 413, 261 A.2d at 90.
EXHUMATION AND AUTOPSY-JURISDICTION BY
COMMON PLEAS COURT, CRIMINAL DIVISION;
RIGHT OF DECEASED'S PARENT TO OBJECT
Kopechne Petition, 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports 213, 47 Pa. D. & C. 2d
579 (C.P. 1969).
In Kopechne Petition,1 the Common Pleas Court of Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania, denied a motion to dismiss entered by the
deceased's parents against a petition filed by the district attorney
of the Southern District of Massachusetts and medical examiner
of Dukes County, Massachusetts for the exhumation of the body
of Mary Jo Kopechne, buried in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania,
for the purpose of autopsy in Massachusetts where deceased had
died. The motion to dismiss specified four reasons: (1) that the
Common Pleas Court of Luzerne County, Criminal Division, did
not have the jurisdiction and authority to grant the relief prayed
for by petitioner;2 (2) that the petition constituted a collateral
attack upon the legal determination of the associate medical ex-
aminer of Dukes County, Massachusetts, "whereas in law such a
legal determination, made in one sovereign state, cannot be col-
laterally attacked in another sovereign state;" 3 (3) that the right
to conduct an autopsy in pursuance of a criminal investigation is a
"right created by statute, and there is no statutory authority which
would give a Pennsylvania court jurisdiction or authority to order
an autopsy in the present manner; '4 and (4) that petitioner did not
sufficiently set forth facts which justify the requested relief.,
The court dismissed the first three reasons entered by the par-
ents but sustained the fourth.6 However, the petition itself was
not dismissed, but rather, the petitioners were granted twenty
days in which to file an amended petition.' In a subsequent hear-
1. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports 213, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 579 (C.P. 1969).
2. Id. at 215, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 581.
3. Id. at 216, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 583.
4. Id. at 217, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 583.
5. Id. at 218, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 584.
6. Id. at 220, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 587.
7. Id. An amended petition was filed by the petitioners and on Octo-
ber 9, 1969, there was a second hearing on a second motion to dismiss by
the Kopechnes, this time directing their objections to the amended petition.
In re Kopechne (No. 2), 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports 233 (C.P. Pa. 1969).
The court dismissed the objection stating that the allegations of fact in the
amended petition were sufficient to hold a hearing on the petition for ex-
humation and autopsy.
ing on the amended petition,8 the court held that the facts pre-
sented were insufficient to uphold the petition for exhumation and
autopsy, sustained the fourth reason originally advanced by the
Kopechnes, and dismissed the petition."
This leads the court to the conclusion that while we are not
adjudging at this time that an exhumation and autopsy should be
allowed, a hearing should be held in order to allow petitioner to
prove the allegations of the amended petition and for the Kopech-
nes to exercise their prerogatives....
Id. at 236.
The allegations in the amended petition included the following:
(SB) A determination by Doctor Mills that the death of
Mary Jo Kopechne was caused by asphyxiation from immer-
sion . . . ; that the cause of death was determined without bene-
fit of autopsy; that Doctor Mills did not perform an autopsy be-
cause he found no external signs of violence or foul play; that the
body of the deceased had been submerged eight hours before his
observation; that it was assumed Mary Jo Kopechne was not only
the driver of the car, but was its sole occupant....
(5C) That the operator of the motor vehicle in which the
deceased's body was found did not report the accident to the po-
lice until approximately ten hours after he said it occurred ...
that there is a witness who claims to have seen the car at 12:40
A.M. on July 19, 1969, with two or possibly three persons in it.
(5D) That said operator pleaded guilty to a motor vehicle
law infraction.
(5E) That the report of the accident made to the Chief of
Police of Edgartown, Massachusetts by the operator . . . dif-
fered from a report of the accident broadcast by the operator on
July 25, 1969.
(5F) That the broadcast and police reports are silent on
many important details of the accident and events surrounding it.
(5G) That persons who were not directly involved in the ac-
cident but who were cognizant of it, did not call the authorities.
(51) That there appeared on the white shirt worn by the de-
ceased "washed out" stains that give a positive benzidine reaction,
an indication of the presence of resident traces of blood.
(5J) That there was present a certain amount of blood in
both the deceased's mouth and nose which may or may not be in-
consistent with death by drowning.
(5K) That the information in paragraphs 5I and 5J was not
available to petitioners until after interment.
Id. at 235.
8. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports 295 (C.P. Pa. 1969).
9. Id. at 304. This Note will discuss the September 2, 1969 hearing
upon the motion to dismiss by the Kopechnes and the law cited therein.
There were no citations of authority in the opinion dismissing the petition.
The latter opinion is summarized as follows:
The court enunciated a five point criterion in law for exhumation and
autopsy:
1. Must be reasonable under the circumstances.
2. Its purpose is to elicit the truth in the promotion of justice.
3. It must be clearly established that:
(a) good cause and
(b) urgent necessity
for such action exist.
4. There must be a strong showing that the facts sought will be
established by an exhumation and autopsy.
5. That the law will reach into the grave in:
(a) only the rarest of cases, and
(b) not even then, unless clearly necessary, and
(c) where there is a reasonable probability that such a viola-
tion of the sepulcher will establish that which is sought.
Id. at 298.
The court then proceeded to examine the facts from two viewpoints:
(1) from a legal viewpoint as they "pertain to the eliciting of truth in
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Concerning the first Kopechne objection as to the jurisdiction
and authority of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County,
Criminal Division,'0 the court emphasized that there was no dis-
agreement as to the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court of
Luzerne County,1 ' but rather, the issue concerned the authority
and jurisdiction of the Criminal Division.
the promotion of justice and the good cause and urgent necessity that
must exist to warrant an exhumation and autopsy," i.e., whether such facts
exist as would cause one in authority to conclude that the deceased died
from a cause other than drowning; and (2) from the medical-legal aspect
that "there must be a strong showing that the facts sought will be estab-
lished by an autopsy and the reasonable probability that the violation of
the sepulcher will establish that which is sought," i.e., whether there is
a reasonable probability that the autopsy will establish any criminal cause
of death. Id.
Concerning the first issue, the court found that there were no facts of
record that could objectively cause one to conclude that a reasonable prob-
ability exists that the cause of death was other than death by drowning.
Id. at 299.
The court stated the following concerning the second issue:
In evaluating (the) medical testimony as it relates to the law
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, it must be concluded that
the petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proof by a
"strong showing that the facts sought will be established by an
exhumation and autopsy" and that there is a "reasonable prob-
ability" that that which is sought warrants a violation of the
sepulcher. A fortiori . ..every reasonable probability leads to a
conclusion that supports the original finding of the cause of death
of Mary Jo Kopechne, asphyxiation by immersion.
Id. at 303. This finding was based on: (1) the testimony of three patholo-
gists for the petitioners whose testimonies were inconvincing as to the
probability of the finding of conclusive evidence contra to a determination
of death by drowning; (2) the testimony of the medical examiner of Dukes
County, Massachusetts who after examination of the deceased's body had
issued the death certificate; and (3) the fact that after his examination the
associate medical examiner released the body to the mortician with a caveat
that there should be no embalming until there was a clearance issued by
the district attorney's office and the state police which evidently was later
issued. Id. at 301 et seq.
The court gave the following weight to the objections of the deceased's
parents to the exhumation:
In view of the testimony and law considered herein, and bear-
ing in mind that courts are not reluctant to grant autopsies in
given cases, we must be mindful that Joseph A. Kopechne and
Gwen L. Kopechne, the parents of Mary Jo Kopechne, have indi-
cated that they are unalterably opposed to exhumation and au-
topsy. Thus, it is incumbent that this court give weight to their
objections. While their disapproval is not an absolute bar to an
exhumation and autopsy, in view of the facts presented to this
court, their objections are well taken.
Id. at 304.
10. See note 2 and accompanying text supra. See generally 25 C.J.S.
Dead Bodies § 4 (1966) and P. JACKsON, THE LAW OF CADAVES 106 (2d
ed. 1950), as to the jurisdiction of a court of equity over exhumation and
autopsy.
11. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 215, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 582.
Under certain circumstances, disinterment of the body
of deceased for evidentiary purposes may be ordered in
civil cases.
Assuming the authority of the court to order the dis-
interment of a body for evidential purposes in a civil case,
where property rights only are involved, it could not be
reasonably argued that the court did not possess a like
power in criminal cases where liberty and even life itself
may be involved.
12
The court cited State v. Wood" in which the Supreme Court of
Maine upheld the right of an accused murderer to have the de-
ceased exhumed and an autopsy held even though a partial autopsy
had been taken immediately after death. 14 In Kopechne, there had
not been even a partial autopsy. Although the petition in Kopechne
did not name a criminal defendant or even state that a crime had
been committed, the court stated:
[it] is brought in the name of the District Attorney in and
for the Southern District of Massachusetts and the Medical
Examiner in and for Dukes County, Massachusetts inquir-
ing into the facts surrounding the death .... This cer-
tainly suggests that the inquiry here is of a criminal rather
than a civil nature.1"
Criminal jurisdiction was, therefore, upheld.
The second objection advanced by the Kopechnes" referred to
a copy of the Massachusetts record of death stating the cause as
asphyxiation by immersion and the deposition of the associate
medical examiner who had made the determination of death.
17
The court summarily dismissed the objection that the petition con-
stituted a collateral attack upon a legal determination made in one
sovereign state which cannot be attacked in another sovereign
state on the ground that the petition did not dispute the associate
medical examiner's findings.' In Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
a medical examiner's findings are considered a legal determina-
tion.19
[T]his court does not know the intention of the Massa-
chusetts authorities in this regard, or what proofs will be
offered at the hearing. Accordingly, this court cannot
12. Id.
13. 127 Me. 197, 142 A. 728 (1928).
14. Id. at 200,
The fact that a partial and unsatisfactory autopsy had ...
prior to the filing of the petition in this case, been made by the
medical examiner . . . in no way effects the authority of the
court to comply with the petitioner's request.
15. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 216, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 582. See also
Commonwealth v. Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 53 A. 753 (1902); In re Brobst, 70
Pa. D. & C. 257 (C.P. Clearfield Co. 1950).
16. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
17. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 216, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 583.
18. Id.
19. See Marvin v. Monroe County, 154 Pa. Super. 75 (1943); MAss.
GEN. LAws ch. 38, § 6 (1932). See generally 18 C.J.S. Coroners § 12
(1939), concerning the judicial authority of a coroner or medical examiner.
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speculate as to a possible collateral attack on [the associate
medical examiner's] determination, and therefore it cannot
be considered at this time.20
It seems that this issue could have been decided either way. The
amended petition stated that the "public interest and proper ad-
ministration of justice requires confirmation of Doctor Mill's origi-
nal determination of the cause of death which can be accomplished
only by an autopsy." 21 Surely, this could equally indicate that
the intent of the petitioner was to prove a cause of death contra to
Doctor Mill's determination. If the petitioner did not believe the
possibility that the medical examiner's findings were incorrect,
there would have been no reason for the hearing.
The third reason advanced for the motion to dismiss concerned
whether or not the right to conduct an autopsy is solely a right
created by statute. 22 The position taken by the petitioners and
upheld by the court was that a court's action in ordering an
autopsy and exhumation is an inherent right of the state.23 "Any
other theory of law, any different course of conduct on the part of
the court would cause judicial proceedings to receive and merit
the contempt of all right-thinking citizens.1
24
In Roberts v. State,25 a prosecution for murder, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi held that it was not necessary that the accused
be made a party to and given notice of the petition of the district
attorney for the exhumation and autopsy of the deceased because:
(1) the accused was not a parent of the deceased, and (2) the ac-
cused was not the owner of the plot of ground in which the de-
ceased was buried.26 The court continued:
Autopsies are sometimes essential to the protection of
health and the discovery of crime. In such a case, the wel-
fare of society demands that the state or its authorized rep-
presentative be permitted to conduct an examination by
dissection if necessary without reference to the wishes of
the relatives of the dead.
27
The interpretation given this case by the Kopechne court results in
the following proposition: A relative of the deceased, other than
his parents, has no standing to protect an exhumation and autopsy,
but even the parents' protest will not be recognized if public policy
20. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 216, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 583.
21. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
22. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
23. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 217, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 584.
24. State v. Wood, 127 Me. 197, 200, 142 A. 728, 730 (1928).
25. 210 Miss. 777, 50 So. 2d 356 (1951).
26. 210 Miss. at 784, 50 So. 2d at 362.
27. Id. at 786, 50 So. 2d at 363,
and justice requires a further look into the causes of the de-
ceased's demise. The Roberts court also addressed itself to the
defendant's contention that allowing an exhumation and autopsy
violated sections of the Mississippi criminal statutes.28 It held
that such statutes refer only to the wanton and criminal disturbance
of interred bodies, or graves, for the purposes of stealing there-
from, and for private gain, and not to exhumation for the public
good.29 Although the Kopechne court did not address itself to the
problem, it would seem that this matter would apply to the first
objection concerning the authority and jurisdiction of the common
pleas court, criminal division. However, on the logic of the Roberts
decision, a review of this matter by the court would have made no
difference in the outcome of the hearing.
The fourth Kopechne objection relating to the insufficiency of
the facts to justify relief3 ° was upheld by the court.31 In their
petition for exhumation and autopsy, petitioners had alleged: (1)
that there was a pending inquest in Dukes County, Massachusetts;
(2) that the deceased was buried in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania;
(3) that the purpose of the inquest was to determine whether or
not there is any reason sufficient to believe that the deceased's
sudden death may have resulted from the act or negligence of
person or persons other than the deceased; and (4) that so as the
circumstances of death be clearly established and the doubt and
suspicion surrounding death be resolved, an exhumation and au-
topsy will be required.8 2 In their brief, petitioners argued that "the
fact that an inquest is being held is sufficient fact alone to justify
the autopsy."3 3  In opposition to this contention, the court again
addressed itself to the consideration which must be given to the
parents' wishes.
A pending inquest in another jurisdiction does not af-
ford this court the opportunity of weighing the right of the
parents to have their daughter's corpse remain undis-
turbed as against the public interest in the administration
of justice. The Kopechnes may have no standing at the in-
quest, but most certainly can exercise their right to be
heard at the exhumation and autopsy proceedings.3 4
The court noted an inconsistency in the argument that an inquest
automatically warrants an autopsy. First, under the law the judge
must exercise his discretion in deciding whether or not to grant
an exhumation and autopsy; 35 "the district attorney's contention
28. Id. Pennsylvania has a similar statute applying to the desecra-
tion of dead bodies. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1237, 1238 (1936).
29. 210 Miss. at 786, 50 So. 2d at 363.
30. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
31. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
32. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 218, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 585.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 219, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 586. It is
assumed here that the court is referring back to its earlier reference to the
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would deny the court the exercise of this discretion."8 6  Secondly,
"it is conceded by the Massachusetts authorities that the parents
are entitled to notice of the autopsy proceedings, a fortiori, they
requested in their prayer for relief that the parents be notified.
3 7
If petitioners' argument concerning the automatic granting of an
autopsy is followed, any notice given the parents would serve no
useful purpose.3 8
As a final point, contra to petitioners' contentions, the court
refused to take judicial notice of "the events surrounding the death
and the doubt and suspicion which exist."3 9
The court, along with millions of other individuals,
has read and heard of the events of the death of Mary Jo
Kopechne, but this cannot be substituted for allegations of
fact in a judicial proceeding.
40
On this particular point, the court could have attempted to expand
the bounds of judicial notice but instead chose the more conserva-
tive approach in what seems to be an attempt to emphasize the
court's impartiality in this politically "loaded" case.
The petitioners were given twenty days in which to file an
amended petition in which sufficient facts to justify the exhuma-
tion and autopsy would be set forth.41 In a third hearing on the
matter and in an opinion which cited no legal authority, the
amended petition was held to not set forth sufficient grounds for
the exhumation and autopsy.
42
KEITH A. CLARK
inherent right of the court to consider the public interest and what could
be gained by an autopsy as weighed against any private interests in-
volved.
36. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 219, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 586.
37. Id.
38. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 530, 135 A. 301, 307
(1926), where the Pennsylvania supreme court said:
Without reciting the averments of the petition and answer, it is
sufficient to say, the former did not state facts which imperatively
required that its prayer be granted, and, when the averments of the
answer are taken into consideration, the matter appears as one en-
tirely for the discretion of the trial tribunal. The petition fails to
disclose what it was proposed to develop through an autopsy
more than had already been shown by the examination of the
body made by the coroner's physician. Moreover, it does not
appear that any notice was given to the near relatives of the de-
ceased of the application to exhume her body; and this, in itself,
would be sufficient to warrant the order made by the court below.
See also Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 76 A.2d 394 (1950); Com-
monwealth v. Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 169 A. 564 (1933).
39. 59 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports at 219, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 586.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 220, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 587.
42. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
MENTAL HEALTH-EQUITY COURT AUTHORIZATION
OF KIDNEY TRANSPLANT FROM
INCOMPETENT TO DYING BROTHER
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
Jerry Strunk, twenty-seven years of age, had an IQ correspond-
ing to that of a six-year-old. He was adjudged, through proper
legal proceedings, mentally incompetent and committed to a state
institution for the feeble-minded. His brother, Tommy, age
twenty-eight, had contracted a fatal kidney disease. Futile efforts
were made among the rest of the family to find a donor who had
the blood type and tissue structure necessary for a kidney trans-
plant. As a last resort, Jerry was tested and found to be highly
acceptable. The mother, as a committee, petitioned the county
court for authority to proceed with a kidney transplant from Jerry
to Tommy. The county court allowed the petition, basing their de-
cision on the testimony of the attending psychiatrist to the effect
that the transplant would be beneficial to Jerry, as he was de-
pendent on Tommy emotionally and psychologically. Jerry's
guardian ad litem appealed to the circuit court which affirmed on
the basis of the testimony of the psychiatrist and the amicus curiae
brief submitted by the Department of Mental Health. An appeal
was taken to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
In a 4-3 decision, the court held that equity had the power to
permit a kidney transplant from an incompetent ward of the state
to his brother who was dying of a kidney disease.' The majority
justified its holding on two grounds. First, equity has the inherent
power to act in regard to incompetents and ". . . the chancellor
has the power to deal with the estate of the incompetent in the
same manner as the incompetent would if he had his faculties."
' 2
This rule is known as the doctrine of substituted judgment.' Sec-
ond, equity may act despite the statutory delegation of duties to
the committees for incompetents and jurisdiction to the county
courts. The Kentucky statute4 restricted the committee to activi-
1. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
2. Id. at 147.
3. E.g., In re Earl of Carysfort, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1840); Ex parte
Whitebread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816); In re Willoughby, 11 Paige 257
(N.Y. 1844); see Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 863 (1969); Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 18
(1965); 27 AM. JuR. 2, Equity § 69 (1966).
4. Ky. Rsv. SrAT. ANN. §§ 387.060, 387.210 (1969).
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ties that would preserve the property of the incompetent and
vested jurisdiction in matters regarding incompetents to the county
courts. The majority held, however, that the statute did not divest
the authority from the appellate court to review the county court.5
In Polivick v. Polivick,6 the Kentucky Court of Appeals had com-
mented on the right of the appellate court to reverse a county
court: "Change in allowance for alimony is subject to be reviewed
by the chancellor at any time that a change of conditions may
necessitate."
7
The dissent in Strunk" presented three principal arguments.
First, it contended that the limited power and authority vested in
the committee should determine the restrictions on the right of
equity to act. It looked first to the statute, which provided that
the committee "shall have the custody of his ward, and the pos-
session, care and management of the ward's property, real and
personal."9  Case law further defines the duties of the committee.
In the election for, or in behalf of, a mental incompetent under
or against a will, courts have held the committee must choose that
which benefits the incompetent. 10 The dissent felt this "benefit"
test should be strictly construed in light of the statute." In
Baker v. Thomas,12 a decision cited by the dissent, the court held:
"The statute does not contemplate that the committee of a lunatic
may exercise any other power than to have the possession, care
and management of the lunatic's or incompetent's estate."' 3 While
5. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969).
6. 259 Ky. 653, 83 S.W.2d 8 (1935). Accord, Thomasson v. Thomas-
son, 310 Ky. 234, 219 S.W.2d 957 (1949); Arms' Committee v. Arms, 260
Ky. 634, 86 S.W.2d 542 (1935); Casebier v. Casebier, 193 Ky. 490, 236 S.W.
966 (1921); Dalton v. Dalton, 172 Ky. 585, 189 S.W. 902 (1916); Pearl v.
M'Dowell, 26 Ky. 658 (1830).
7. Polivick v. Polivick, 259 Ky. 653, 655, 83 S.W.2d 8, 11 (1935).
8. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
9. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 387.060 (1969).
10. E.g., In re Estate of Klekunas, 205 N.E.2d 497 (Ill. App. 1965);
Ramsey's Ex'r v. Ramsey, 243 Ky. 202, 47 S.W.2d 1059 (1932); Harding v.
Harding, 140 Ky. 277, 130 S.W. 1098 (1910); In re Brown, 212 App. Div. 677,
209 N.Y.S. 288, aff'd, 240 N.Y. 646, 148 N.E. 742 (1925); In re Peden's Es-
tate, 409 Pa. 194, 185 A.2d 794 (1962); Gerlach's Estate, 127 Pa. Super. 293,
193 A. 467 (1937).
11. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969) (dissenting
opinion).
12. 272 Ky. 605, 114 S.W.2d 1113 (1938).
13. Id. at 606, 114 S.W.2d at 1114. See also McCreary v. Billing, 176
Ala. 314, 58 So. 311 (1912); Richards v. East Tennessee U. & G.R.R.R., 106
Ga. 614, 33 S.E. 193 (1899); Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. 167 (1856); Town-
send v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412 (1860); Deal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 218 N.C. 483, 11 S.E.2d 464 (1940); Latta v. General Assembly of Pres-
byterian Church, 213 N.C. 462, 196 S.E. 862 (1938).
it is conceded that case law dictates that the committee is to be re-
stricted to its statutory powers, it is submitted that the dissent
has not established a lack of power to act.
The second argument of the dissent is in the form of an
arguendo. Even if the court allowed the doctrine of substituted
judgment to be applied, the petitioner has not "conclusively dem-
onstrated" 14 that the operation would be beneficial to the incom-
petent. The dissent rejects the expert testimony of the attending
psychiatrist and the opinion of the Department of Mental Health
when it states:
It is common knowledge beyond dispute that the loss of a
close relative or friend to a six-year-old child is not of
major impact. Opinions concerning psychological trauma
are at best most nebulous. Furthermore there are no
guarantees that the transplant will become a surgical suc-
cess, it being well known that body rejection of trans-
planted organs is frequent. The life of the incompetent is
not in danger, but the surgical procedure advocates some
peril.15
It is submitted the dissent erred in concluding the "benefit" test
had not been satisfied. There is no doubt that the operation would
create a hazard to the incompetent, but the petitioner presented
substantial evidence to show the transplant would be beneficial to
the incompetent donor.16
The final contention of the dissent is that "consent is a pre-
requisite to the donation of a part of the human body."'17 The only
appellate court case which contains a discussion of the issue of
consent in circumstances somewhat similar to the case at bar is
Bonner v. Moran.' A fifteen-year-old boy permitted a physician
to take skin grafts from his side and legs for his severely burned
cousin. The mother knew nothing of the operation at the time the
first grafts were taken. The Circuit Court of the District of Colum-
bia held the consent of the child was ineffective to prevent liability
on the doctor for a battery:
But in all cases the basic consideration is whether the
proposed operation is for the benefit of the child and is
done with the purpose of saving his life or limb. The cir-
cumstances are wholly without the compass of any of these
exceptions. Here the operation was entirely for the bene-
fit of another and involved sacrifice on the part of the in-
fant of fully two months of schooling, in addition to seri-
ous pain and possible results affecting his future life.1 9
The appellate court in Bonner reversed the lower court and re-
14. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Ky. 1969) (dissenting
opinion).
15. Id. at 150 (dissenting opinion).
16. Id. at 146-47.
17. Id. at 150 (dissenting opinion).
18. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
19. Id. at 123.
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manded for a new trial, but implied that the actions of the mother
in the two month period may have amounted to ratification or
consent by implication.
The defendant in the Bonner case relied on Bakker v. Welsh
20
and the Restatement of Torts in his argument that, if the minor is
capable of understanding the effect of the operation, his consent
thereto should be valid.2 1 The Bonner court rejected this reason-
ing. In Bakker v. Welsh,22 a seventeen-year-old boy, who lived on
a farm with his father, developed a tumor on his ear. On the advice
of his father he traveled to the city where a surgeon concluded that
the tumor should be removed. The boy returned to the farm and
later went back to the city where his aunt and two other adults con-
sented to the operation and the use of a general anesthetic. The
boy died during the operation from a reaction to the anesthetic,
and the father sued the surgeon and the anesthetist. The Michigan
Supeme Crout held the defendants were not liable for the death
of the boy, as he was fully aware of the risks involved in the opera-
tion. The court, in commenting on the lack of express consent on
the part of the father, said, "There is nothing in the record to indi-
cate that, if the consent of the father had been asked, it would not
have been freely given."23
Section 59 of the Restatement of Torts proposes a rule con-
sistent with the Bakker case:
If a person whose interest is invaded is at the time by rea-
son of his youth or defective mental condition, whether
permanent or temporary, incapable of understanding or
appreciating the consequences of the invasion, the assent
of such person to the invasion thereto is not effective as
a consent thereto.
24
Stated conversely, the argument of the Restatement is that, if a
person is capable of understanding or appreciating the consequences
of the invasion, his assent thereto is effective as consent. This ap-
proach seems to focus on the application of a test after the fact. It
looks at the facts as they existed at the time of the invasion to de-
termine whether the defendant afterward should be held liable.
The doctrine of substituted judgment, on the other hand, suggests
a means to discern liability before the invasion occurs. It is sub-
mitted that either of these positions represents a better-reasoned
approach to the problem of consent in the field of medicine than
20. 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906).
21. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
22. 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906).
23. Id. at 634, 108 N.W. at 96.
24. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59 (1934).
the Bonner25 decision or the minority view in Strunk.26
A survey of case law shows that courts have extended the
scope of application of the doctrine of substituted judgment. In
Ex parte Whitebread,27 the decision which established the doctrine,
the wife and children of an incompetent were permitted to use
funds from the considerable estate of the incompetent for their
education and support. The rationale for the holding was:
The principle that it would be more agreeable to the luna-
tic, and more to his advantage, that they should receive an
education and maintenance suitable to his condition, than
that they should be sent into the world to disgrace him as
beggars.
28
Another decision, In re Earl of Carysfort,29 applied the doctrine
of substituted judgment to persons outside the family of the in-
competent by allowing an annuity to be taken from the income of
a lunatic's estate to provide a retirement pension for a personal
servant of the lunatic. The court felt ". . . the allowance was
one which the lunatic, if he should ever recover, would ap-
prove .... "30
The first case to apply the doctrine of substituted judgment
in America was In re Willoughby,81 which held that a step-daughter
was not entitled to payment from the estate of the incompetent.
The court stated that where the person petitioning for the allowance
had a legal claim to the estate of the incompetent, the allowance
was to be in the form of an advance which could later be deducted
from the amount inherited at the death of the incompetent. The
court, in disallowing the petition, established two important guide-
lines for future cases. It found initially that it must be "perfectly
certain" how the lunatic would act ". . . considering the heavy
charges to which his estate has been and may hereafter be sub-
jected in consequence of the proceedings.13 2 The court also indi-
cated the need of the potential recipient and the wishes of the in-
competent, if possible, should be established by substantial evi-
dence. 3
In recent years, courts have been willing to substitute their
judgment in cases involving possible loss of life. Where Jehovah's
Witnesses refused to consent to blood transfusions, appellate courts
intervened and ordered the transfusions to prevent the deaths of
the patients.34 A law review article written over ten years ago.3 5
25. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See text accompanying note 17
supra.
26. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). See text accompanying note 16 supra.
27. 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
28. Id. at 879.
29. 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1840).
30. Id.
31. 11 Paige 257 (N.Y. 1844).
32. Id. at 260.
33. Id. at 261.
34. In re Georgetown College, Inc., 31 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
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contained a discussion of three Massachusetts cases on the trial
level which allowed transplants from minors to their twins dying
of kidney diseases.36 In each case the court relied on the testimony
of the psychiatrist that there would be "grave emotional impact"
if the twin died, and of the donor that he understood and accepted
the risks of the operation. The author of the article presented, but
did not attempt to answer, the issue raised by having an incompe-
tent donor.
87
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Strunk v. Strunk"8 faced a
unique fact situation, distinguishable from the cases discussed
above. In the case at bar, the potential donor was an incompetent
hardly able to communicate, his family had consented to and pe-
titioned for the operation, and expert evidence was introduced to
show that, under the circumstances, the donor would benefit from
the transplant. It is submitted that the majority properly con-
cluded that these factors justified its application of the equitable
doctrine of substituted judgment in this novel situation.
ROBERT F. COX, JR.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.
Conn. 1965); see Trout, Blood Transfusions, 73 DicK. L. REV. 201 (1969).
35. Curren, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplant in Minors,
34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1959).
36. Foster v. Harrison, Equity No. 68674 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Nov. 20,
1957); Huskey v. Harrison, Equity No. 68666 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Aug. 30,
1957); Masden v. Harrison, Equity No. 68651 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. June 12,
1957).
37. Curren, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplant in Minors,
34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891, 895-96 (1959).
38. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
ARMED FORCES-NONRESIDENT SERVICEMEN NOT
EXEMPT FROM STATE SALES AND USE TAXES
United States v. Sullivan, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
Section 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act' grants
a measure of immunity from state taxation to servicemen stationed
in a state other than their state of domicile. The extent of this
immunity is the subject matter of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Sullivan.2 The United States,
in its capacity as a plaintiff representative of militay personnel,
brought suit against Connecticut tax officials for a declaratory
judgment that section 514 prevents Connecticut from collecting
sales and use taxes fro mnonresident servicemen. The United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut entered the
requested declaratory judgment in favor of the United States.3 The
1. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act § 514, 50 U.S.C. App. § 574
(1964) [hereinafter referred to as Section 5141, provides in part as follows:
(1) For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of his
personal property, income, or gross income by any State,
... such person shall not be deemed to have lost a residence
or domicile in any State, . . . solely by reason of being absent
therefrom in compliance with military or naval orders, or to
have acquired a residence or domicile in, . . . any other
State, . . . while and solely by reason of being, so absent.
For the purpose of taxation in respect of the personal prop-
erty ... of any such person [nonresident serviceman] by any
State. . . of which such person is not a resident or in which
he is not domiciled, [ (a) ] compensation for military or naval
service shall not be deemed income for services performed
within, or from sources within such State [station state] ...
and [(b)] [his] personal property shall not be deemed to
be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in
such State .... Where the owner of personal property is
absent from his resident or domicile solely by reason of
compliance with military or naval orders, this section applies
with respect to personal property, or the use thereof, within
any tax jurisdiction [his station state] other than such place
of residence or domicile, regardless of where the owner may
be serving in compliance with such orders: Provided, That
nothing contained in this section shall prevent taxation by
any State ... in respect of personal property used in or
arising from a trade or business, if it otherwise has jurisdic-
tion. ...
(2) When used in this section, (a) the term "personal property"
shall include tangible and intangible property (including mo-
tor vehicles), and (b) the term "taxation" shall include but
not be limited to licenses, fees, or excises imposed in respect
to motor vehicles or the use thereof: Provided, That the li-
cense, fee, or excise required by the State . . . of which the
person is a resident or in which he is domiciled has been paid.
2. 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
3. United States v. Sullivan, 270 F. Supp. 236 (D. Conn. 1967), aff'd,
398 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 295 U.S. 169 (1969).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, expressing the unanimous view
that the exemption contained in section 514 did not apply to state
sales or use taxes.5
Connecticut, as do most states, levies a broad pattern of sales
and use taxes on retail sales of tangible personal property.6 Under
the sales tax, retailers are required to pay the state 31% of gross
receipts on goods subject to the tax.7 The retailers are entitled to
reimbursement of this tax from their customers.8 The Connecticut
use tax is similar to most state use taxes in that it is imposed upon
the use or other consumption of property within Connecticut, when
the user has not paid a sales tax in Connecticut or elsewhere. The
proceeds of the sales and use taxes are to be allocated and expended
only for public health, welfare, and educational purposes.'0 Sec-
tion 514 of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(1) . . For the purposes of taxation in respect of --------
personal property . . . of any such person [nonresident
serviceman] by any State . . . of which such person is not
a resident or in which such person is not domiciled . . .
[his] personal property shall not be deemed to be located
or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such
State. .... 1.
This statutory setting raises the issue of whether sales and use
taxes are included by the words "taxation in respect of personal
property" found in section 514.
Two Supreme Court cases have had a great impact on the
meaning of the words "taxation in respect of personal property"
and therefore will be discussed before analyzing the Court's opinion
in Sullivan. In Dameron v. Brodhead,"2 a state levied an ad val-
orum personal property tax on the personal property of a nonresi-
dent serviceman. The host state argued that since the serviceman's
state of domicile had not taxed the property, section 514 did not
bar the tax for there was no possibility of double taxation. The
4. United States v. Sullivan, 398 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395
U.S. 169 (1969).
5. United States v. Sullivan, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-406-32(a) (1958).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-408(1) (1958).
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-411 (1958).
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-432 (1958).
10. Id.
11. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act § 514, 50 U.S.C, APP. § 574
(1964) (emphasis added). The full provision of § 574 is quoted in note 1
supra.
12. 345 U.S. 322 (1953).
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that a nonresident
serviceman's immunity from a tangible personal property tax levied
by his station state adhered even though the serviceman had not
paid a tax upon his property in his home state. The Court ex-
plained that,
Though the evils of potential multiple taxation may have
given rise to this provision [section 514] Congress appears
to have chosen the broader technique of the statute care-
fully, freeing servicemen from both income and property
taxes imposed by a state by virtue of their presence there
as a result of military orders.
13
Thus, it appears that Dameron did not restrict the statute's purpose
and effect to those types of taxes which would result in double
taxation.
The Court in California v. Buzard14 was faced with the prob-
lem of interpreting the following language of subsection (2) (b)
of section 514: "the term taxation shall include but not be limited
to licenses, fees, or excises imposed in respect to motor vehicles or
the use thereof."'15 The Court held that if the nonresident service-
man does not pay his domicile state's license, fee, or excise imposed
in respect to his motor vehicle or the use thereof, the station state
can impose such a tax but ". . . only to the extent that these taxes
are essential to the functioning of the station state's licensing and
registration laws in their application to the motor vehicles of non-
resident servicemen."'1 6 The Court in Buzard also considered that
the over all purpose of section 514 was to free nonresident service-
men from taxes which defray the general expenses of the govern-
ment of the host state.
1 7
United State v. Sullivan begins with a separate discussion of
sales taxes. The Court first recognizes that section 514 refers to
taxes "in respect of" personal property rather than simply "on"
personal property which is the usual way of referring only to ad
valorem personal property taxes. However, the Court goes on to
state that "it would be an overly strained construction to say that
taxation of the sales transaction itself is the same as taxation in
respect of personal property."' 8 It would seem that this is a mere
conclusion by the Court with no reasoning to support it. In fact, it
appears that the Court did not give any weight to the plain meaning
of the words "taxation in respect of personal property" in deciding
whether there was an overly strained construction of the phrase.
Some common definitions of the phrase "in respect of" include
13. Id. at 326 [emphasis added].
14. 382 U.S. 386 (1966).
15. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act § 514, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 574
(1964).
16. Id. at 393.
17. Id. at 395.
18. 395 U.S. 169, 175 (1969).
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in relation to,'" arising out of,2 0 and with reference to. 21 These
definitions lead to the conclusion that for a tax to be encompassed
by the phrase "in respect of personal property," the tax must have
a relation to, refer to, or arise out of personal property. Since it is
necessary to refer to the sales price of the personal property to
impose both sales and use taxes, a sound contention can be made
that "taxation in respect of personal property" includes sales and
use taxes. Since this phrase is the heart of the issue in Sullivan, it
is submitted that the Court should have considered the usual or
plain meaning of the language when deciding that the phrase was
being overly strained to apply to a particular type of tax.
The Sullivan Court next relies on the silence of Congress to
support its decision, reasoning that "if Congress had intended to
exclude sales and use taxes it would not have employed language
so poorly suited to that purpose as taxation in respect of personal
property. ' 22 The fundamental weakness of such an argument is
apparent. As the Second Circuit in its opinion in Sullivan pointed
out, inferences can be drawn either way from an argument based
on silence.23 By not explicitly enumerating sales and use taxes
and other types of taxes, Congress could have intended the words
"taxation in respect of personal property" to be broad enough to
deter states from enacting taxes which would relate to a nonresi-
dent serviceman's personal property but would not be a sales or
use tax and therefore would not be covered by the exemption of
section 514. The silence doctrine can also support the conclusion
that section 514 covers sales and use taxes based on the reasoning
used by the Second Circuit in its opinion in Sullivan. That court
suggested that if Congress had wanted to allow state sales and use
taxes on nonresident servicemen, it would have logically said so
in the provision which allows nonresident servicemen's personal
property to be taxed if it is used or arises from a trade or business.
24
Although the Supreme Court concedes that use taxes are not
so clearly excluded by the language of section 514, as are sales
taxes, the Court relies on the legislative history of the 1942 enact-
ment of the Soldiers & Sailors Civil Relief Act 25 and the 194426
19. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 323, 326
(N.D. II. 1941).
20. Commissioner v. Alta Mines, Inc., 139 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir.
1943).
21. WEBsTER's NEw 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1542 (2nd Ed. 1964).
22. 395 U.S. 169, 176 (1969).
23. 398 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1968).
24. Id.
25. Act of Oct. 6, 1942, ch. 581, § 17, 56 Stat. 777.
26. Act of July 3, 1944, ch. 39'7, § 1, 58 Stat. 722.
and 196227 amendments of that act to prove that the words "taxa-
tion in respect of personal property" exempt only annually recur-
ring ad valorem taxes on personal property. The Court refers to
statements in the legislative history which refer to "servicemen
having their property taxed by more than one state within same
calendar year. ' 28 The Court then reasons that the language of
these reports shows that the purpose of section 514 is to prevent
multiple state taxation of the property of servicemen and therefore
does not apply to sales or use taxes which are imposed only where
there has been a retail sales transaction. 29 This announced purpose
of section 514 seems to run counter to the Supreme Court's decision
in Dameron v. Brodhead.30 But the Court sidesteps Brodhead by
impliedly reasoning that although the purpose of section 514 is
broad enough to cover situations where there is no danger of
multiple state taxation, as in Brodhead, "the predominant legisla-
tive purpose [prevention of multiple state taxation] remains highly
relevant in determining the scope of the exemption."3' 1  The
Court then concludes that "the absence of any significant risk of
double taxation under state sales and use taxes is strong evidence of
congressional intent not to include them in section 514."32 The
Court's adoption in Sullivan of a predominant legislative purpose of
section 514 rather than an application of all the legislative purposes
of section 514, as it apparently did in Brodhead, seems unfounded
and, as a result, merely a device used to achieve a predetermined
result.
The next obstacle the Sullivan Court meets is the statement
made by Mr. Justice Brennan in his opinion for a unanimous Court
is California v. Buzard.33 The Sullivan Court states quite succinctly
what it considers to be its holding in Buzard:
[s]ubsection (2) (b) of section 514 does not encompass ordi-
nary revenue-raising excise or use taxes, but is limited to
those taxes which are essential to the functioning of the
host State's licensing and registration laws in their appli-
cation to the motor vehicles of nonresident servicemen.3 4
Since California v. Buzard only interpreted subsection (2) (b) of
section 514 involving motor vehicle registration fees, the holding
of that case would involve only that subsection of section 514. But
in analyzing the Court's opinion in Buzard, it appears that Mr
Justice Brennan did expressly consider the overall purpose of sec-
tion 514 and for a unanimous Court stated that this purpose was
27. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-771, 76 Stat. 768.
28. S. REP. No. 1558, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1942); H.R. REP. No.
2198, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942).
29. 395 U.S. 169, 177 (1969).
30. See note 12 and accompanying text suTra.
31. 395 U.S. 169, 177 (1969).
32. 395 U.S. 169, 180 (1969).
33. 382 U.S. 386, 393, 395 (1966).
34. 395 U.S. 169, 182 (1969).
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"to free nonresident servicemen from the burden of taxes which
defray the general expenses of government." 5  Both the district
and circuit courts in Sullivan relied heavily on this statement
reasoning that the Connecticut sales and use taxes were taxes which
defrayed the general expenses of government"0 and therefore are
within the purpose and exemption of section 514 as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Buzard.3 7 In fact this dictum in Buzard
concerning the purpose of section 514 in all likelihood was the
impetus for the suit for declaratory judgment concerning the ap-
plicability of section 514 to state sales and use taxes.
Therefore, when the Supreme Court in Sullivan states that
subsection (2) (b) of section 514 does not encompass ordinary rev-
enue-raising excise or use taxes, it approves of the strict holding
of Buzard. However, the Sullivan Court refuses to recognize and
does not attempt to explain the dictum in Buzard to the effect that
section 514 was enacted to free nonresident servicemen from the
burden of taxes which seek to defray the general expenses of
government.
The definite retreat in Sullivan from the spirit of both the
Dameron and Buzard cases can best be explained by looking at the
policy factors present in Sullivan. The Supreme Court notes that
35 states filed briefs in this case in support of Connecticut's posi-
tion.38 The support by these states is understandable; loss of reve-
nue, as well as significant administrative and accounting burdens
which the states' retailers and tax officials would have to bear,
would have resulted if the Supreme Court had held that section
514 applied to sales and use taxes. In addition, the Court probably
considered the possibility of nonresident servicemen buying goods
for persons not entitled to the sales and use tax exemption, with
the result of receiving reimbursement from these persons who
would thereby avoid state sales taxes. Still another policy factor
considered by the Court is the fact that military personnel can
purchase "all the necessities and many of the luxuries of life tax-
free at military commissaries."'3 9
It is submitted that the Court relied heavily on these policy
35. California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386, 393, 395 (1966) (dictum).
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-432 (1958): "All proceeds of the
sales and use taxes shall be allocated to and expended for public health,
welfare and education purposes only."
37. United States v. Sullivan, 398 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd,
395 U.S. 169 (1969); United States v. Sullivan, 270 F. Supp. 236, 243 (D.
Conn. 1967), affd, 398 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1968, rev'd, 395 U.S. 169 (1969)).
38. 395 U.S. 169, 171 (1969).
39. 395 U.S. 169, 179 (1969).
factors and simply decided that the best solution under the circum-
stances was to hold that section 514 did not include sales and use
taxes. By so holding, the Supreme Court has not placed the
burden of passing a law exempting servicemen from sales and use
taxes on the proponents of such exemption.
EDWARD M. FEDOK
TORTS-NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY
HELD LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO
PROVIDE ADEQUATE POLICE PROTECTION
Bass v. City of New York, - Misc. 2d -, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
In Bass v. City of New York' at the trial term of the Supreme
Court of Kings County, Justice Samuel S. Leibowitz held the New
York City Housing Authority,2 as landlord of a privately sponsored
and maintained housing project, liable for negligence in failing
to provide' an adequate police force to protect its tenants from
molestation. Under the parties' agreed statement of facts, the
project had a history of crime known to defendant Housing Author-
ity which had pursuant to section 402 of the Public Housing Law3
undertaken to organize and maintain its own police force.
Lourdes Bass, a nine year old girl, lived with her parents in
Farragut Houses, a housing project owned and operated by the
New York City Housing Authority. While on her way back to
school at lunchtime Lourdes was seized near the rear entrance hall
of the building by a resident of another building in the same project.
She was taken to the roof of the building and raped. After mo-
mentarily escaping, she was again seized and dropped from the
roof, fourteen stories above the courtyard; she died from the re-
1. - Misc. 2d -, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Action was dis-
continued against the city leaving the New York City Housing Authority
as defendant.
2. Created pursuant to PuBLic HOusING LAW § 400 (McKinney
Supp. 1969).
3. The Public Housing Law provides:
5.... the New York City Housing Authority shall have the
power in its discretion to provide and maintain a housing police
department and a uniformed housing police force. Such depart-
ment and force shall have the power and it shall be their duty, in
and about housing facilities, to preserve the public peace, prevent
crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs and insur-
rections, disperse unlawful or dangerous assemblages and assem-
blages which obstruct free passage; protect the rights of persons
and property; guard the public health; remove all nuisances; en-
force and prevent violation of all laws and ordinances; and for
these purposes to arrest all persons guilty of violating any law or
ordinance .... Each member of such force shall be a peace officer
as defined by section one hundred fifty-four of the code of criminal
procedure and, while on duty, shall possess all the powers of a
policeman of a city in the execution of criminal process; and
criminal process issued by any court or magistrate of a city may
be directed to and executed by a member of such force.
PUBLIC Housrvo LAW § 402 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
sultant injuries. At the time of the incident the only housing police
officer assigned to the project was at lunch. The victim's father,
as administrator of her estate, brought survival4 and wrongful
death actions.
5
In finding the Housing Authority liable, Justice Leibowitz em-
phasized the facts that defendant had undertaken to maintain a
protective police force, thereby lulling the tenants into a false
sense of security and that the police force was inadequate to pro-
tect persons and property in the crime-ridden project. With no
cases directly on point, the court relied heavily on basic tort law.
The decision falls short of overruling the generally accepted rule
that a municipal corporation, or an agency thereof, is not liable
for its failure to provide police protection to an individual. 6 The
result, however, was not predicated upon the tenuous distinctions
between proprietary and governmental functions7 or between mis-
feasance and nonfeasance of government agents.8 Although the
court emphasized a duty approach to the Housing Authority's ob-
ligations to the tenant, it conceded that defendant was not an in-
surer of the personal safety and property of its tenants. The court
noted:
But that simple proposition leaves open a host of situations
which call for some reasonable measure of care and pro-
tection. I have no difficulty with the "reasonable" care
mandated by tort law, which the situation here called for.
At the time of the occurrence, there was none.9
Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act waives governmental
immunity in New York and provides:
§ 8. Waiver of immunity from liability
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability
and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to
have the same determined in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
4. ESTATES, PowERs A" TRusTs LAW § 11-3.2 (McKinney 1967).
5. ESTATES, PowERS AND TRusTs LAw § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
6. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.
2d 897 (1968); Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635,
256 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965); Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d
704 (1945); Moch Co. v. Renssalaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896
(1928); Scott v. City of New York, 2 App. Div. 2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 787
(1956); Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1946);
New York City Housing Authority v. Jackson, 58 Misc. 2d 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d
237 (Civ. Ct. 1968); Jones v. City of Herkimer, 51 Misc. 2d 130, 272
N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Libertella v. Maenza, 21 Misc. 2d 317, 191
N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
7. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.
2d 750 (1946).
8. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); Meistinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132
N.E.2d 900 (1956); McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d
419 (1947).




against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant
complies with the limitations of this article.10
The waiver has been extended to subdivisions of the state." The
cases arising under section 8 have left a confusing history of lia-
bility in New York. 12 Recovery has been denied by the general rule
that municipalities have no duty to provide adequate police or fire
protection."3 Recovery has also been denied by the policy con-
sideration that extension of municipal liability would impose a
crushing financial burden on the city.14 Further, since the organi-
zation and deployment of police forces is considered a legislative-
administrative matter involving allocation of municipal resources,
courts are powerless to substitute their judgment for the ad-
ministrative decisions of other branches of government. 15 Thus,
relief has been denied where an accident resulted from a failure of
the police to prevent a driver from further operation of a vehicle
in violation of the law,16 where the fire department failed to take
action against a known defective gas heater,17 and where the police
failed to protect a plaintiff at her request from her rejected suitor
who had been terrorizing her for six months.'
8
To avoid the general rule that a municipality and its agencies
10. COURT op CLAiMs ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963).
11. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604
(1945), affg, 268 App. Div. 444, 51 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1944).
12. See cases cited notes 14-22 infra.
13. See cases cited note 6 supra. In Motyka v. City of Amsterdam,
15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965), the court said lia-
bility arises from a statute only where disregard of the command of the
statute results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute has been enacted. Further, the city was not liable for a failure to
supply general police or fire protection. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y.
51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
14. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704
(1945). For one view of the effect of holding the municipality or its
agency liable, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Keating in Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
15. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.
2d 897 (1968); Langer v. City of New York, 9 Misc. 2d 1002, 171 N.Y.S.2d
390 (1958), aff'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 709, 185 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1959); New York
City Housing Authority v. Jackson, 58 Misc. 2d 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d 237
(Civ. Ct. 1968).
16. Libertella v. Maenza, 21 Misc. 2d 317, 191 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
17. Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256
N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965). In Messineo v. City of Amsterdam, 17 N.Y.2d 523, 215
N.E.2d 163, 267 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1966), the court felt compelled to follow the
Motyka case but called attention to the injustice of the rule and its in-
congruity under modern decisions.
18. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.
2d 897 (1968).
are not liable for furnishing an inadequate police force, some courts
have found that a special relationship exists between the plaintiff
and defendant municipality. 19 In Schuster v. City of New York,
20
the majority found the existence of a special relationship between
the city acting through its police department and the plaintiff's
intestate who had supplied the department with information lead-
ing to the arrest of Willie Sutton. Decedent's part in the arrest had
been widely publicized. He was shot three weeks later. The court
held that the special relationship gave rise to a special duty to use
reasonable care for the protection of citizens who collaborate with
the police once it reasonably appears they are in danger due to the
collaboration. Liability was predicated upon the police depart-
ment's failure to provide a bodyguard and its negligent assurance
that the decedent was in no danger. In Jones v. City of Herkimer,
2"
failure to protect plaintiff's decedent in the face of a long history
of threats and assaults amounted to facts constituting liability. In
addition, the courts have found the New York City Housing Author-
ity liable for ineffectively enforcing rules it established when vio-
lation resulted in injury to children. 22
In the Bass decision Justice Leibowitz distinguished the cases
relied on by the Housing Authority. New York City Housing Au-
thority v. Jackson23 was technically a counterclaim of constructive
eviction against a summary proceeding for nonpayment of rent.
In Riss v. City of New York 24 the court distinguished governmental
activities in private enterprise from those wholly within the public
sector. In Bass the activity of the Housing Authority was entirely
a private enterprise. The court further found that Schuster v.
City of New York 25 was not at odds with plaintiff's position in Bass
since the Housing Authority had assumed the burden of protec-
tion and later failed to fulfill its obligation.
The Bass court cited Amoruso v. New York City Transit Au-
thority,26 Abbott v. New York Public Library7 and Caldwell v.
Village of Island Park,28 three cases in which liability was based on
19. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); Jones v. City of Herkimer, 51 Misc. 2d 130, 272 N.Y.S.
2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
20. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
21. 51 Misc. 2d 130, 272 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Compare Riss v.
City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968),
with Jones v. City of Herkimer, 51 Misc. 2d 130, 272 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
22. Geigel v. New York City Housing Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 838,
233 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1962); DaRocha v. New York City Housing Authority,
109 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1951). See Caldwell v. Village of Island Park,
304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
23. 58 Misc. 2d 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
24. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
25. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
26. 12 App. Div. 2d 11, 207 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1960).
27. 263 App. Div. 314, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1942).
28. 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
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a violation of the duty to use ordinary care to avoid foreseeable
danger. Attention was also directed to Goldberg v. Housing Au-
thority of Newark29 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held
the Housing Authority of Newark not liable for its failure to pro-
vide police protection. The Newark Authority, however, had no
statutory power to organize a police force as did the New York City
Authority. It is submitted that the Bass court placed too much
emphasis on the effect of the absence of that statute in the decision.
The Goldberg majority stated that, even if a statute had existed giv-
ing the Authority power to organize a police force, the Housing
Authority would not have been liable because the duty to provide
police protection is governmental in nature, inevitably vague and
ill suited to a landlord's capabilities.3 0 Justice Leibowitz found the
minority opinion 31 in Goldberg particularly persuasive in its call
for liability based on the duty of a reasonably prudent person in
the face of an unreasonable, foreseeable risk of harm
Housing authorities are normally charged with at least the
same responsibilities as any other landlord.32 The New York City
Housing Authority, however, was given statutory powers3 3 beyond
that of other landlords. The justice stated:
I firmly believe that a landlord of a privately sponsored
and maintained housing complex such as this, with a
similar history of crime and disorder, should bear a special
responsibility to protect its residents from these lawless
elements. How much greater then is that duty on the part
of this defendant who was given the power, and which
did in fact choose, to organize its own protective force who
are vested with all authority of a regular police force?
Having made this choice, it became its further obligation
to provide this protection in adequate measure to reason-
ably secure its tenants against molestation in its own
property.
3 4
The court charged the Housing Authority at a minimum with a
29. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
30. Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 591, 186
A.2d 291, 297-98 (1962).
31. Id. at 593, 186 A.2d at 299. (Dissenting opinion by Jacobs, J.,
Proctor and Schettino, JJ.).
32. E.g., Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186
A.2d 291 (1962); see 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 297 (1968).
33. PUBLic HousiNG LAW § 402 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
34. Bass v. City of New York, - Misc. 2d -, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801, 807
(Sup. Ct. 1969). Contra, New York City Housing Authority v. Jackson,
58 Misc. 2d 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Civ. Ct. 1968), New York City Housing
Authority v. Medlin, 57 Misc. 2d 145, 291 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Civ. Ct. 1968),
Libertella v. Maenza, 21 Misc. 2d 317, 191 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
RESTATEMEXT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
duty to call upon the New York City Police Department to furnish
the protection it could not. This duty appears reasonable in light
of a finding of fact that a tacit understanding existed between the
police department and the Housing Authority that the city police
would keep out of the project 6
Finally, Justice Leibowitz addressed himself to the issue of
causation and found the lack of protection to have been a substan-
tial factor in causing the injuries3 because an adequate police force
would have acted as a substantial deterrent to criminal activity.
Further, the criminal activity of the child's killer was not a super-
seding, independent cause of the injury but was related to the de-
fendant's total failure of supervision, protection and other reason-
able precautions. The criminal's act was a foreseeable, interven-
ing force.3 T The result is supported by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts:
§448. Intentionally Tortious or Criminal Acts Done Under
Opportunity Afforded by Actor's Negligence
The act of a third person in committing an intentional
tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another
resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct
created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the
third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor
at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have
realized the likelihood that such a situation might be
created, and that a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.38
§449. Tortious or Criminal Acts the Probability of Which
Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular
manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the
actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent,
intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby. 9
Without going deeply into the nature of governmental ac-
tivities, the court found the Authority liable on fundamental tort
principles: 40 voluntary assumption of a duty and a subsequent
breach. The courts have found the Transit Authority,41 the pub-
lic library42 and the city 43 liable for failure to provide police pro-
tection. It is submitted that under the circumstances of this case
the Housing Authority was properly held to the same standards of
care.
HOLLY E. MOEHLMANN
35. See also Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark, 38 N.J. 578,
591, 186 A.2d 291, 298 (1962), State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962).
36. Abbott v. New York Public Library, 263 App. Div. 314, 32
N.Y.S.2d 963 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
37. DiSabato v. Soffes, 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1959);
Matter of Guardian Casualty v. Wright, 253 App. Div. 360, 2 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1938); 38 AM. JuN. Negligence §§ 67, 71 (1941).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or ToRTs § 448 (1965).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-PENNSYLVANIA STILL
CLINGS TO ITS "NO ALTERNATIVE
REMEDIES" REQUIREMENT
C.H. Pitt Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America, 435 Pa. 381,
257 A.2d 857 (1969).
A doorman of the Carlton House Hotel was attempting to move
a paraplegic's car when suddenly the car began accelerating back-
ward at high speed. A collision abruptly terminated the car's back-
ward progress. The startled doorman then attempted to ease the
car forward, but again lost control of the car. This time the car
began accelerating forward at high speed, and again its progress
was halted by a collision. As a result of these collisions, several
people were injured, four cars were damaged, and two lawsuits
were brought against the C.H. Pitt Corporation (Pitt) as owner
and operator of the Carlton House Hotel.
Pitt notified its insurance carrier, the Insurance Company of
North America (I.N.A.), of the pending claims. I.N.A. denied
coverage. Pitt then sought a declaratory judgment (1) that Pitt
was entitled to coverage under the policy, and (2) that I.N.A. was
obliged to defend Pitt in the pending lawsuits. I.N.A. contended
that a declaratory proceeding would not lie. The trial court,' how-
ever, decided that:
[T]he case at bar is precisely the type of case that the De-
claratory Judgment Act 2 was intended for. The insurers
of the Carlton House Hotel have raised a technical, legal
question and denied defense and coverage....
In view of the technical involvement and the resultant
potential multiplicity of trials, . . . the Court is drawn to
the conclusion that the declaratory judgment procedure,
under the fact situation as presented to this court, is prop-
er .... 3
Accordingly, the case was tried. Most of the facts were stipu-
lated. At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered in
favor of Pitt; I.N.A. appealed.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, 4 holding that
1. C.H. Pitt Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, No. 3344 (C.P.
Allegh., filed Nov. 2, 1966), rev'd, 435 Pa. 381,257 A.2d 857 (1969).
2. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, PA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, §§
831-46 (1953).
3. Record at 90a-91a.
4. C.H. Pitt Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 435 Pa. 381,
257 A.2d 857 (1969).
"[a] declaratory judgment proceeding should not be entertained if
there exists another established and appropriate remedy."5  The
court was of the opinion that Pitt had the "adequate" alternative
remedy of defending the lawsuits itself and then suing I.N.A. in
assumpsit to recover any losses incurred.
In dissent,6 Mr. Justice Roberts, joined by Mr. Justice Pome-
roy, declared:
It is an ongoing source of amazement to me that a ma-
jority of this Court can continue to ignore the explicit
language of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 7 . , .
[which] provides in no uncertain terms that the availability
of other relief, legal or equitable, "shall not debar a party
from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory judgment or
decree in any case where the other essentials to such relief
are present. ... "I
Justice Roberts concluded that the trial judge, in his discretion,
could have refused to entertain the declaratory proceeding, but he
was not required to do soY
Pitt stands for the principle that a declaratory judgment will
not lie if another remedy is available. In holding that the appro-
priateness of a declaratory proceeding depends on the absence of
alternative remedies, Pitt does not depart from existing Pennsyl-
vania law.10 In fact, the significance of Pitt lies in its dogmatic
adherence to this Pennsylvania "no alternative remedies" require-
ment. Significantly, this requirement has been repudiated by pre-
vailing United States case law,11 by leading commentators, 12 and
apparently by the express language of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act.
13
The soundness of the Pennsylvania "no alternative remedies"
requirement must be examined with respect to the Uniform De-
claratory Judgments Act and its legislative history in Pennsyl-
vania. 14 In its original form, the Act permitted a court to refuse a
declaratory judgment when such a judgment would not terminate
5. Id. at 385, 257 A.2d at 860.
6. Id. at 386, 257 A.2d at 860.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 836 (1953).
8. C.H. Pitt Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 435 Pa. 381,
386, 257 A.2d 857, 860 (1969) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
9. Id.
10. See cases cited note 29 infra; note 35 infra.
11. See 22 Am. JuR. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 14 (1965).
12. See, e.g., 1 W. ANDERSON, ACTIONS rOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
§ 195 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; E. BoRcaARD, DE-
CLARATORY JUDGMENTS 315-46 (2d ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as BORCHAID].
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 836 (1953); see wording of the von Mosch-
zisker amendment quoted in text accompanying note 23 infra, which is the
current wording of the pertinent part of § 836.
14. For a detailed account of the Act's legislative history in Pennsyl-
vania, see McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 659-61, 179 A-2d 222, 230
(1962) (concurring and dissenting opinion); In re Johnson's Estate, 403




the controversy. 5 Confusion arose when an early case' 6 interpret-
ing the Act was misquoted.' 7 As a result, the requirement that
there must be no other "statutory" remedy available' s was trans-
formed into the requirement that there must be no other "equally
serviceable" remedy available.' 9 Eventually, a declaratory pro-
ceeding was deemed to be improper if any established legal or
equitable remedy was available.
2
In an attempt to restore the Act to its original meaning, and
to align Pennsylvania with other jurisdictions interpreting the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,2 ' Judge von Moschzisker
22
drafted an amendment which provided that:
The mere fact that an actual or threatened controversy is
susceptible of relief through a general common law remedy,
or an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy,
whether such remedy is recognized or regulated by statute
or not, shall not debar a party from the privilege of obtain-
ing a declaratory judgment or decree in any case where the
other essentials to such relief are present .... 23
The von Moschzisker amendment was clear as originally written,
but unfortunately an additional clause was appended before the
amendment was enacted. The additional clause, in declaring "but
the case is not ripe for relief by way of such common law rem-
edy . . .",,24 caused considerable confusion. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court interpreted the amendment, in its final form, to mean
that a declaratory judgment can never lie if the case is ripe for re-
lief by way of another remedy, and that a case is ripe for such relief
if another remedy is available.25 This appears to be the precise
result which Judge von Moschzisker had attempted to avoid, and
arguably, at least, the supreme court misinterpreted the amend-
ment.
26
15. Act of June 18, 1923, No. 321, § 6, [1923] Pa. Laws 840.
16. Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 A. 265 (1925).
17. Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa. 263, 142 A. 224 (1928).
18. Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 471, 131 A. 265, 271 (1925).
19. Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa. 263, 264, 142 A. 224, 224 (1928).
20. See In re Johnson's Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 480-81 n.4, 171 A.2d 518,
520 n.4 (1961).
21. Id. at 482, 171 A.2d at 521.
22. The former Chief Justice Robert von Moschzisker drafted the
amendment after retiring from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
23. In re Johnson's Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 482-83, 171 A.2d 518, 521
(1961). In its final form the amendment was adopted in the Act of April
25, 1935, No. 33, § 1, [1935] Pa. Laws 72.
24. Act of April 25, 1935, No. 33, § 1, [1935] Pa. Laws 72.
25. See Stofflet v. Tillotson, 346 Pa. 574, 577, 31 A.2d 274, 275 (1943);
Allegheny County v. Equitable Gas Co., 321 Pa. 127, 129, 183 A. 916, 917
(1936).
26. See BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 321-25.
By 1943 the Pennsylvania legislature was prompted to delete
the troublesome "ripe for relief" phrase, leaving the amendment
essentially in the same form as when it was originally written by
Judge von Moschzisker. 27 The confusion, however, has remained.
28
Two groups of cases have emerged. One group supports the more
restrictive view that a declaratory judgment will not lie if there
is another "available", "appropriate", "adequate", or "established"
remedy.2 9 The other group supports the more liberal view that a
declaratory judgment may be entertained even though a common
law remedy is also available.8 0 Typical of the more restrictive
group of cases is Bierkamp v. Rubinstein31 In Rubinstein, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that "an action for declara-
tory judgment is not an optional substitute for established, avail-
able and appropriate remedies and should not be entertained if
another available and appropriate remedy exists. '5 2 Typical of the
27. Act of May 26, 1943, No. 284, § 1, [1943] Pa. Laws 645, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 836 (1953).
28. For an excellent discussion on the confusion in Pennsylvania re-
garding the effect of alternative remedies in declaratory judgment cases,
see Note, Section 6 of Pennsylvania's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
24 U. PiTT. L. Rrv. 793, 799-802 (1963).
29. Bierkamp v. Rubinstein, 432 Pa. 89, 246 A.2d 654 (1968) (ease-
ment rights; "available and appropriate"); Mains v. Fulton, 423 Pa. 520,
224 A.2d 195 (1966) (easement rights; "available and appropriate");
Carlsson v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 417 Pa. 356, 207 A.2d 759 (1965)
(liability insurance policy; "adequate"); Greenberg v. -Blumberg, 416 Pa.
226, 206 A.2d 16 (1965) (enforceability of restrictive covenant; "more ap-
propriate"); In re Mohney's Estate, 416 Pa. 107, 204 A.2d 916 (1964) (dis-
tribution of estate; statutory remedy available; "available and appropri-
ate"); Lakeland Joint School Dist. Auth. v. School Dist., 414 Pa. 451, 200
A.2d 748 (1964) (right to withdraw from a jointure contract; "available
and appropriate"; no other "available and appropriate" remedies existed
so a declaratory judgment was allowed); Stevenson v. Stein, 412 Pa. 478,
195 A.2d 268 (1963) (declaration of ownership by adverse possession;
,'more appropriate"; no other "appropriate" remedy was available so a
declaratory judgment was permitted); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Semple, 407 Pa. 572, 180 A.2d 925 (1962) (liability insurance pol-
icy; "more appropriate"); McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 179 A.2d 222
(1962) (reformation of contract; "established and available") (In a con-
curring and dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Benjamin Jones suggested,
contra to the majority opinion, that the availability of an alternative rem-
edy should not per se bar a declaratory judgment, but should merely be
one factor to consider when the court exercises its discretion. Id. at 658,
179 A.2d at 229.); In re Holt's Estate, 405 Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961)
(declaratory judgment proceeding to set aside the probate of a will; the
proceeding was held to be improper, but was affirmed anyway; "more
appropriate"); Wirkman v. Wirkman Co., 392 Pa. 63, 139 A.2d 658 (1958)
(breach of covenant; parties had provided for arbitration; "more appro-
priate").
30. In re Johnson's Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 171 A.2d 518 (1961) (con-
struction of a will); Daniels Co. v. Nevling, 385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814
(1956) (interpretation of a contract); Philadelphia Mfrs. Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Rose, 364 Pa. 15, 70 A.2d 316 (1950) (fire insurance policy); Guerra
v. Galatic, 185 Pa. Super. 385, 137 A.2d 866 (1958) (determination of
boundaries).
31. 432 Pa. 89, 246 A.2d 654 (1968) (easement rights).
32. Id. at 94, 246 A.2d at 656. In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice
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more liberal group of cases is In re Johnson's Estate"3 in which the
same court declared:
An examination of the legislative history . . . clearly re-
veals the intent of the legislature that declaratory judg-
ments be considered an alternative, rather than an extra-
ordinary, remedy and that the existence of another remedy,
in law or in equity, will not per se bar declaratory judg-
ment. Since passage of the 1943 statute our Court has con-
sistently taken this position.
3 4
The majority of the Pennsylvania cases adhere to the more re-
strictive rule barring a declaratory judgment when alternative
remedies are available. 35 Although Pitt clearly reaffirms this re-
strictive rule, the outcome to be expected in any one case is apt to
be uncertain because of the conflicting results in the decided cases.
One reason for the conflicting results in the decided cases
is the use of the word "mere" in the statutory pronouncement that
the "mere" availability of alternative remedies shall not debar a
declaratory judgment.38 The use of the word "mere" renders
the statute susceptible to the interpretation that if the alternative
remedy is more than just "available", a declaratory judgment will
be debarred. Taking this approach, a court can declare that if an
alternative remedy is "appropriate", "adequate", or "established",
then the alternative remedy is more than just "available", and,
hence, the declaratory judgment should be debarred.
The validity of this "more than mere" approach is questionable.
A court advocating such an approach may be accused of hair-split-
ting. It is somewhat difficult to conceive of an alternative remedy
which would be "available" and yet at the same time not be "estab-
lished" or capable of being deemed "appropriate".
In interpreting the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, at-
tention should be directed to the consideration that "the declaratory
judgment action is an instrumentality to be wielded in the interest
of preventive justice, and its scope should be kept wide and liberal,
and should not be hedged about by technicalities. '3 7 The Act itself
declares that its provisions are to be "liberally construed and ad-
Benjamin Jones disagreed with the majority concerning the holding quoted
in the accompanying text. Id. at 95, 246 A.2d at 657.
33. 403 Pa. 476, 171 A.2d 518 (1961) (construction of a will).
34. Id. at 485-86, 171 A.2d at 522. In dissent the then Mr. Justice Bell
declared that the majority opinion had ignored established Pennsylvania
principles on declaratory judgments and that the result would be an un-
settling of the existing law. Id. at 491, 171 A.2d at 525.
35. See cases cited note 29 supra; ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 401.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 836 (1953).
37. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 14-15.
ministered."38  These guidelines of construction have led to the
view that:
[I] t is far more consonant with the ends of justice to follow
the more modern, sounder, and juster rule that the declara-
tory judgment procedure is equally applicable in all cases
where it is proper to apply it without regard to the exist-
ence of any other remedy. 9
It appears that the declaratory judgment procedure is particu-
larly applicable and proper in the case of a controverted insurance
contract, as in Pitt. In fact, controversies between insurer and in-
sured have been adjudicated in declaratory judgment proceedings
independent of a statute.4 0 Declaratory judgments are especially
common in insurance litigation 4' and the general rule in the United
States is that a declaratory judgment may be entertained to deter-
mine the extent of insurance coverage and to adjudicate the in-
surer's duties under an insurance contract, regardless of the avail-
ability of other remedies.42 Pennsylvania has generally been more
restrictive than the general rule in its use of declaratory judg-
ments in insurance cases. However, in 1950 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court allowed a declaratory judgment for the purpose of
determining whether or not coverage existed under a fire insurance
policy, even though the "adequate" remedy of assumpsit was also
available.
43
Compelling reasons support the use of declaratory judgments
in liability insurance cases such as Pitt. Declaratory judgments
eliminate the burden, otherwise cast upon the insured, of first de-
fending itself against claims of third parties and then afterward
having to sue the insurer in assumpsit. In the absence of a declara-
tory judgment it might be years before the insured, through multi-
ple lawsuits, finally receives reimbursement. This is particularly
likely if every verdict favorable to a third party must first be ap-
pealed before the insured can sue the insurer. Furthermore, the
insured would hesitate to settle with a third party because of the
possibility that, in the subsequent suit against the insurer, the in-
surer might successfully raise the defense that the settlement was
unreasonable or unnecessary. Because of these circumstances, the
declaratory judgment is a particularly effective remedy and the
alternative remedies would appear, by comparison, to be inade-
quate.
It is submitted that Pitt further adds to what has been charac-
38. PA. STAT. ANt. tit. 12, § 842 (1953).
39. AprnmsoN, supra note 12, at 395.
40. ANDERsoN, supra note 12, at 6.
41. See Note, Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-
1941-1949, 62 HA.v. L. Rsv. 787, 850 (1949).
42. See 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 63 (1956).
43. Philadelphia Mfrs. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rose, 364 Pa. 15, 22, 70
A.2d 316, 319 (1950).
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terized as the "Pennsylvania muddle"."4 To clear the muddle,
Pennsylvania should adopt a consistent, definitive, and forward-
looking policy which is more consonant with the purpose of the
declaratory judgment. Specifically, Pennsylvania might well con-
sider liberalizing its "no alternative remedies" requirement. In-
stead of requiring that there must be no alternative remedies
available, Pennsylvania could justifiably require that there must
be no more effective and expedient remedies available. 45 Thus,
claimants could be afforded the benefit of declaratory relief so
long as the granting of such relief would serve a useful purpose.
ROBERT A. NARAGON
44. BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 318.
45. For an example of a decision adopting this view, see Recall Ben-
nett Comm. v. Bennett, 196 Or. 299, 249 P.2d 479 (1952).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF THE, JURY TRIAL REQUIREMENT
DeBacker v. Brainard, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
The United States Supreme Court recently held that its deci-
sions in Duncan v. Louisiana1 and Bloom v. Illinois,2 which guar-
anteed the right to trial by jury for serious criminal offenses in
state actions by applying the sixth amendment to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, will not be applied retroactively to
review adjudications of delinquency made without a jury in state
juvenile courts.3
DeBacker had been committed to the Boys Training School at
Kearney, Nebraska following a hearing before a juvenile court
judge sitting without a jury. The hearing arose out of allegations
sufficient to require a jury trial under Duncan and Bloom if the
act had been committed by an adult. DeBacker requested a jury
trial prior to the hearing, which request was denied, and he subse-
quently sought habeas corpus based on that denial. The petition
for habeas corpus was denied, and, on appeal to the Nebraska Su-
preme Court, the decision was affirmed by a divided court.4 In the
United States Supreme Court, the issue was considered, inter alia,
whether-in light of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom--a jury
trial was required in state juvenile proceedings based on an act
which, if committed by an adult, would require a jury trial if re-
quested. The Court refused to decide this issue based on its earlier
holding in DeStefano v. Woods' that the Duncan and Bloom deci-
sions would apply only prospectively. Since DeBacker's juvenile
hearing had been held prior to the date of those two cases, there
could be no relief.6
DeBacker, which upholds the prospective application of a new
decision in the field of criminal procedure, is indicative of a fairly
recent trend toward uniform prospective application of such new
rules rather than the earlier practice of deciding retroactive or
1. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
3. DeBacker v. Brainard, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
4. Four of the seven justices thought that the Nebraska statute re-
quiring hearings without a jury was unconstitutional, but the Nebraska
Constitution in Article V provides that five judges must concur to hold a
legislative act unconstitutional.
5. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
6. DeBacker v. Brainard, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 163, 164 (1969).
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prospective application on the merits of each case. The Supreme
Court has given retroactive application to cases where coerced con-
fessions are involved,7 where paupers are denied the right to ap-
peal, 8 and where the right to counsel is denied." On the other
hand, in cases involving illegal search and seizure,10 comment by
the prosecutor on defendant's silence, 1 lack of Miranda warnings,' 2
and now right to trial by jury,1 the new rule has been given only
prospective application.
An historical review of the applicable cases' 4 shows that, as Mr.
Justice Cardozo said, ". . . the federal constitution has no voice on
the subject [of prospective or retroactive application]."" Even
Mr. Justice Black, who has dissented in every recent case holding
for prospective application of a new rule, has agreed that there are
valid arguments to be made for prospective application.' 6 In fact,
".. . there is no impediment-constitutional or philosophical-to
the use of the same rule in the constitutional area where the exigen-
cies of the situation require."'1 7 Relying on this historical view, the
Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker' defined several tests with
which a determination of retroactivity may be made: (1) the pur-
pose of the new rule, (2) the reliance placed upon the old doctrine,
and (3) the effect of retroaction on the administration of justice.19
However, above all these standards there appeared to be one over-
riding consideration in the early days of the criminal procedure
revolution. The Court stated in Linkletter that in all the cases
where an overruling was applied retroactively, it was done so be-
cause the principle involved went to the very fairness of the trial,
the heart of the fact-finding integrity.20 Griffin v. Illinois,21 hold-
ing that pauper defendants must be allowed the right to appeal,
was applied retroactively to a defendant, who had been denied an
7. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
8. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 215 (1968).
9. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
10. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
11. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
12. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
13. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
14. This review is set out in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965).
15. Great Northern R.R. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358,
364 (1932).
16. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 276 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
17. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 636.
20. Id. at 639.
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
appeal in 1935, because the ability to appeal is so basic to the fair-
ness of the judicial system.2 2  Gideon v. Wainwright28 was applied
retroactively because without counsel defendants are unable to
find their way through the technical morass of criminal procedure,
and thus fair fact-finding is impossible. Jackson v. Denno24 was
applied retroactively because of the likelihood that coerced con-
fessions will introduce incorrect statements into the fact-finding
process.
25
That this fairness of trial fact-finding integrity test was the
principal consideration for retroactive application may easily be
seen by comparing the above cases with the decision in Linklet-
ter.26 That case tested the application of the Mapp v. Ohio2T exclu-
sionary rule. Consideration of the three tests listed by the court in
Linkletter indicated that most important test is the one relating
to the purpose of the new decision. Comparison shows that the re-
sults of the test considering the effect of retroactivity on the ad-
ministration of justice would be the same in all the cases, con-
victed parties must be retried, stale evidence must be considered,
overcrowded court calendars must be further cluttered; in short
the effect of retroactivity would be immense in all cases. The test
of reliance on the old rule will show similarity as great. What
else would enforcement officials rely upon but the criminal proce-
dure currently being condoned by the courts? Therefore, the
test relating to the purpose of the new rule is the key factor. As
described above, in the three areas where the rule was retro-
actively applied, the purpose of the new rule went to the integrity
of the fact finding. In Linkletter, however, the purpose of the
new rule as expounded in Mapp is to protect the sanctity of the
individual by deterring the lawless searches and seizures by the
police.28 The exclusion of the evidence obtained in such searches
does not add to the integrity of the fact-finding process of the
trial; instead, it protects citizens from overzealous police. Thus
this purpose test is the only real distinction between the cases
applied prospectively and those applied retroactively. That this
test is a valid discriminating factor cannot be denied. If the old
standard deterred the proper finding of facts or encouraged the
admission of incorrect facts, any trial under that standard is in-
herently unfair, and the new standard should be applied retro-
actively so that those convicted under such a standard may be re-
tried. If, however, the new standard does not go to this fact-find-
ing process, but rather goes merely to some collateral right (e.g.,
22. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
25. See cases cited note 7 supra.
26. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
27. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28. 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
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privacy under the Mapp 29 rule), then the trial itself was not unfair,
and the new ruling ought only to be applied to the future.A0
It appears that in DeStefano v. Woods"1 and DeBacker v. Brain-
ard,3 1 the Court has slipped away from this standard requiring
retroactive application to decisions enhancing the fact-finding proc-
ess with respect to trial by jury. But the withdrawal has been
gradual and an examination of the interim cases is helpful.
Tehan v. Shott"3 tested the retroactive applicability of the
rule in Griffin v. California8 4 which prohibits comment by a prose-
cutor or judge on the silence of a defendant at trial. Under con-
sideration was the privilege against self-incrimination. Here the
tests of reliance on the old rule and the detrimental effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application would lead
to a conclusion that the rule ought only to be applied prospectively,
but, as shown above, these two tests will always lead to that find-
ing. The crucial test should be whether the purpose of the new
rule is to enhance the correct finding of facts. The Court found
that the purposes which were behind the rule do not require
retroactive application because the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of
the truth, but rather is a reflection of the constitutional values
behind the right to be let alone.35 Thus the Court was able to hold
that the rule should be applied only prospectively.
It appears to this writer that the Tehan decision, although it
may be correct, represents the first minor intrusion on the valid
principle discussed above. The decision bends the fact-finding test
to the extent that comment by the prosecutor on defendant's silence
may indeed effect the jury's finding of facts by prejudicing de-
fendant's case. In Tehan the day was carried for prospective ap-
plication by consideration of the other two tests.
In Johnson v. New Jersey"6 the Court was called upon to de-
cide the retroactivity of the rules announced in Miranda and
Escobedo.37 In the Johnson case, 8 language is found which begins
to undermine the standard found so important in earlier. cases:
29. Id. at 637.
30. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, at 638-39.
31. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
32. DeBacker v. Brainard, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
33. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
34. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
35. 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
36. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
38. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
"Finally, we emphasize," said the Court, "that the question whether
a constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does not en-
hance the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is neces-
sarily a matter of degree."3 9 Once having set out this qualifica-
tion, it is obvious that the court may now decide for prospective
application in every case by simply balancing the purpose of the
rule test and outweighing its results with the always favorable
(to prospective application) reliance and administration of justice
tests. Look at Johnson:
Thus while Escobedo and Miranda provide important new
safeguards against the use of unreliable statements at trial,
the non-retroactivity will not preclude persons whose trials
have already been completed from invoking the same safe-
guards as part of an involuntariness claim.40
This all sounds well and good, but Johnson was sentenced to death
and the New Jersey Court Rules precluded further hearings on
voluntariness.
41
Compare this decision with Stovall v. Denno,42 which consid-
ered whether decisions requiring that defendant's counsel be pres-
ent when defendant is exhibited to identifying witnesses should be
applied retroactively. 43 It was seen that the right to counsel is
essential, and that the rule requiring counsel applied retroactively,
but here the Court found that it is only a matter of degree. The
Court quoted the above passage from Johnson favorably and then
said that these probabilities must be weighed against the prior
justified reliance on the old rule and the impact of the new rule
on the administration of justice. Admitting that a conviction based
on faulty identification would be a "gross miscarriage of justice,"
nevertheless the Court applied the rule only prospectively.
That brings this discussion to DeStefano v. Woods,44 where
the right to a jury trial was given only prospective application, and
DeBacker v. Brainard,45 where the Court refused to review the
DeStefano ruling where juveniles are involved. In these decisions
the purpose of the new rule apparently goes directly to the integ-
rity of the fact-finding at trial. In DeStefano the Court stated the
purpose of the rule to be the prevention of repression and arbi-
trariness;46 these are at the very heart of the fact-finding process!
Yet, the application of the matter of degree argument 47 allowed the
39. Id. at 728-29.
40. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 735.
42. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
43. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
44. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
45. - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
46. 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968).
47. We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial.., or
any particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or that a
defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would
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Court to apply Duncan48 and BlooM 49 only prospectively.
DeBacker v. Brainard"0 provided a vehicle whereby the Court
could have retreated from its present standard, which seems
to require prospective application in every case, and returned to
that standard which was so valuable in coerced confession and
right to counsel cases. Instead, the Court continues to ignore the
very valid standard allowing retroactive application where the new
rule enhances the fact-finding integrity at trial and continues to
rely, almost wholly, upon the previous reliance and administration
of justice tests.
Indeed by applying a proper standard in DeBacker the Court
could have reached the merits of what seems to be, in light of In re
Gault,51 an important issue. Do juveniles have the right to trial by
jury in state juvenile court proceedings? The decision in DeStefano
appears to have most definitely buried the fairness standard and
prompts some question as to whether Griffin v. Illinois,52 Gideon




DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1968).
48. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
49. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
50. - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 163 (1969).
51 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
53. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

